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COUNTING CHICKENS WHEN THEY HATCH: TIMING
AND THE EFFECTS OF AID ON GROWTH*
Michael A. Clemens, Steven Radelet, Rikhil R. Bhavnani and Samuel Bazzi
Recent research yields widely divergent estimates of the cross-country relationship between foreign
aid receipts and economic growth. We re-analyse data from the three most influential published
aid–growth studies, strictly conserving their regression specifications, with sensible assumptions
about the timing of aid effects and without questionable instruments. All three research designs show
that increases in aid have been followed on average by increases in investment and growth. The most
plausible explanation is that aid causes some degree of growth in recipient countries, although the
magnitude of this relationship is modest, varies greatly across recipients and diminishes at high levels
of aid.
Economists have spent decades debating, without resolution, the cross-country rela-
tionship between foreign aid receipts and economic growth. Some find that aid
robustly causes positive economic growth on average. Others cannot distinguish the
average effect from zero. Still others find an effect only in certain countries, such as
those with good policies or governance. Wearied readers of this literature would be
right to wonder what produces diverse findings from apparently the same aid and
growth data.
Here, we show that two traits of previous research help to explain why different
studies reach different conclusions. Both traits relate to how these studies treat the
timing of causal relationships between aid and growth. First, the most cited research has
focused on measuring the effect of aggregate aid on contemporaneous growth, while
many aid-funded projects can take a long time to influence growth. Funding for a new
road might affect economic activity in short order, funding for a vaccination campaign
might only affect growth decades later and humanitarian assistance may never affect
growth. Second, because current growth is likely to affect current aid, these studies
require a strategy to disentangle correlation from causation. They have tended to rely
on instrumental variables but the instruments that have been used are of questionable
validity and strength. When these issues are addressed, the divergence in empirical
findings is greatly reduced.
We show this by stepwise altering the research design of the three most influential
papers in the aid and growth literature. We hold all else constant: we begin by
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reconstructing their data and using precisely their regression specifications. This
transparency and consistency is essential in a literature that has been alternately
described as marred by aid proponents confirmation bias (Easterly, 2006, p. 48) or
described as marred by aid opponents selective reading of the empirical evidence
(Hansen and Tarp, 2000, p. 393). We avoid poor-quality instrumental variables and
instead address potential biases from reverse and simultaneous causation by the more
transparent methods of lagging and differencing. We test only one lag structure (the
simplest) and only one disaggregation of aid, both of which were established before
running the regressions and were not altered thereafter. All other aspects of the
regressions remain as in the authors original papers.
This exercise reveals that the results of all three studies change markedly: when we
allow aid to affect growth with a time lag; when first-differencing removes the effects of
time-invariant omitted variables; and when we consider only those portions of aid that
could be intended or expected to produce growth within a few years. These steps allow
us to avoid the use of poor-quality instrumental variables that have pervaded this lit-
erature. With these sensible alterations, the data reveal that over the last three decades,
substantial increases in aid receipts were followed on average by small increases in
investment and growth.
The fact that some amount of growth typically follows aid receipts does not per se
establish causation. We discuss and test other possible explanations but all are less
plausible than aid causing some non-zero amount of growth. The results are not an
artefact of dynamic panel bias, of our assumed functional form, or of mean reversion in
the data. The magnitudes of the coefficients we estimate are reasonable and consistent
across different specifications, with a one percentage-point increase in aid/gross
domestic product (GDP) (at mean aid levels) typically being followed within several
years by modest increases in investment and growth: a 0.3–0.5 percentage-point
increase in investment/GDP and a 0.1–0.2 percentage-point increase in growth of real
GDP per capita.
These results do not in any way suggest that aid always works or that large amounts
of aid can be the central pillar of any given country’s growth strategy. The results do
suggest that the effect of aid on growth is positive on average across all countries, but is
limited and quite modest in comparison with other determinants of growth, and is
negative in some countries. We begin by putting these findings in broader context.
1. Four Decades of Diverse Findings
Griffin and Enos (1970) launch this literature by reporting zero or negative bivariate
correlation between aid receipts and growth in 27 countries, a finding essentially
echoed by Weisskopf (1972). Papanek (1972, 1973) is the first to conduct a multi-
variate regression of growth on aid, in a model resembling
_yi;t=yi;t ¼ aþ bdneti;t þ X i;tgþ ei;t ; ð1Þ
where yi,t is income per capita in country i at time t, d
net
i;t is net disbursements of aid, Xi,t
is a vector of country characteristics, a and b are constants, g is a vector of constants, ei,t
is white noise, and a superscript dot represents the derivative with respect to time. He
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and Gulati (1978) find a significant positive partial correlation between aid and growth
in 51 countries during 1950–65, but not in the Americas.
Over (1975) and Mosley (1980) first attempt to isolate the causal portion of the
aid–growth relationship with instrumental variables, in models resembling
_yi;t=yi;t ¼ aþ bdneti;t þ X i;tgþ ei;t
dneti;t ¼ Z i;tfþ mi;t ;
ð2Þ
where Zi,t is a vector of exogenous instruments, f is a vector of constants, and mi,t is white
noise. Several related studies follow, each using different countries, years and
instruments. All are troubled by relatively short time periods and limited country
samples (Gupta and Islam, 1983; Mosley et al., 1987; Levy, 1988).
Boone (1996) ushers in the current wave of aid–growth studies with more complete
data than any predecessor. Across 96 countries, between 1971 and 1990, he finds no
relationship between aid receipts and investment. He concludes that aid programs
have not ... engendered or correlated with the basic ingredients that cause ... growth.
He bases this conclusion on a restricted sample of countries that eliminates those
receiving the most aid; Boone’s own regressions with the full sample of countries show
a positive and significant relationship between aid and investment, as we discuss in
detail below. In any event, an influential article in The Economist reporting Boone’s early
findings was entitled Down the Rathole. The aid–growth literature since 1996 can be
read as a series of responses to Boone’s result.
1.1. The Conditional  Strand
The first strand argues that Boone fails to observe a relationship between aid and
growth on average because aid only causes growth in some countries and not in others.
By far, the most influential of these is the work of Burnside and Dollar (2000), who find
that aid causes growth only in a subset of countries that maintain low inflation, do not
run large budget deficits and are open to trade.1 All of these studies use a model
resembling
_yi;t=yi;t ¼ aþ bdneti;t þ cqi;t þ dðdneti;t  qi;tÞ þ X i;tgþ h ln yi;t þ ei;t ;
dneti;t ¼ Z i;tfþ mi;t ;
ð3Þ
where qi,t is some country characteristic on which the effect of aid depends, and c and d
are constants. Most of these studies fail to detect a significant unconditional effect of
aid on growth, that is, when d is constrained to zero. Easterly (2003), Easterly et al.
(2004) and Roodman (2007) cast serious doubt on the conclusions of a majority of
these studies. They find that the significance of the interaction coefficient d is sensitive
to influential observations and extensions of the dataset.
1 Other work in this vein has tested whether or not the aid–growth effect is conditional on export price
shocks (Collier and Dehn, 2001); climatic shocks and trends and volatility in the terms of trade (Guillaumont
and Chauvet, 2001; Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2004); policy and institutional quality (Collier and Dollar,
2002); institutional quality alone (Burnside and Dollar, 2004); policy and warfare (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004)
and totalitarian government (Islam, M. N. 2003).
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1.2. The Unconditional Strand
The second strand argues that Boone fails to observe a positive effect of aid due to the
regression specification or time period used.2 Many papers in this strand argue that aid
can have diminishing returns (contra Boone) and estimate a model similar to
_yi;t=yi;t ¼ aþ bdneti;t þ kðdneti;t Þ
2 þ X i;tgþ h ln yi;t þ ei;t ;
dneti;t ¼ Z i;tfþ mi;t :
ð4Þ
Among these, the most influential published work is that of Hansen and Tarp (2001),
who find a strong, non-linear impact of instrumented aid on growth that does not
depend on influential observations.3 They instrument current aid with lagged aid, an
identification strategy that rests on the persistence of aid and the absence of direct
effects on current growth from lagged aid. This latter assumption in particular is
questionable.4
1.3. The Null  Strand
A third strand argues that the evidence gathered since 1990 simply confirms Boone’s
null result. They expand on Boone by using growth directly as the dependent variable
rather than investment, and by using more extensive data. By far the most influential of
these is the work of Rajan and Subramanian (2008), whose core results instrument for
aid with measures of country size and political ties to donors, much as Boone did. On
this null result, they base the policy conclusion that the aid apparatus will have to be
rethought. Below, we dissect this and the other most influential studies in this literature.
2. A Way Forward: Timing and Identification
In this article, we explore the reasons for the divergence among these strands of
literature. We find that when straightforward changes are made to the most influential
2 Here, we discuss only studies that focus on growth as the outcome. Other strands of this literature
investigate aid effects beyond growth, such as schooling (Dreher et al., 2008) and governance (Knack and
Rahman, 2007; Djankov et al., 2008).
3 The first to allow for a non-linear effect are Hadjimichael et al. (1995), who find a strongly positive impact
of aid with diminishing returns in a Generalised Least Squares cross-section of 31 African countries, 1986–92.
Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) are the first among these to instrument for aid, and Hansen and Tarp (2000)
are the first to use a GMM estimator in this literature. Lensink and White (2001) confirm the non-linear
impact in a sample of 111 countries, 1975–92, with a 2SLS estimator. Dalgaard et al. (2004), while emphasising
the significant interaction between aid and fraction of land in the tropics, find an unconditional positive and
non-linear effect of aid in the absence of the interaction. Other published studies do not include a squared
aid term, but belong in the unconditional strand because they find an impact of aid on growth not con-
ditioned on interaction with any other recipient-country trait. Lensink and Morrissey (2000) include an
indicator of uncertainty in aid flows and extend the observation period to 25 years. They are the first among
aid–growth researchers to include a convergence term in their regressions. Their OLS cross-section of
75 countries finds a strongly significant, positive, linear relationship between aid and growth. The differenced
GMM results of Moreira (2005) show a highly significant, positive, non-linear impact of aid in 48 countries
from 1970 to 1998.
4 Clemens et al. (2004) likewise find a positive, unconditional, non-linear, causal relationship between aid
and growth, in some of their regressions that instrument with lagged aid flows. Werker et al. (2009) use oil
prices to instrument for aid flows from Gulf donors to predominantly Muslim aid-recipient countries. They
find a positive relationship between lagged aid and growth with a coefficient of 0.22, although it is statistically
significant only at the 10% level.
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papers in each strand, much of the divergence disappears. These are as follows:
allowing aid to affect growth with a time lag; first-differencing to eliminate omitted
variable bias from time-invariant unobserved traits; and considering only those portions
of aid that might produce growth within a few years. This allows us to avoid the use of
potentially invalid and weak instrumental variables and seeking causal identification by
more transparent means. Here, we discuss the reasons for these choices.
2.1. The Timing of Aid Effects
Clemens et al. (2004) argue that Boone and his successors may have failed to
observe a positive effect of aggregate aid because some aid is aimed at activities
whose growth impact has slim theoretical basis within the time periods used in the
panel. These include flows that are not intended or used to promote expansion in
generalised productive capacity (such as humanitarian assistance or disaster relief) as
well as flows whose effect on overall national growth, if it ever arrives, might come
long after the time period under study (such as a vaccination campaign or school
feeding project).5
The question of when to test for growth impacts plagues the entire growth literature,
not just aid–growth research. Empirical research on the determinants of growth cannot
escape the selection of a fixed observation period, but selecting the time intervals over
which to study growth ... is a question that remains largely unsettled (Temple, 1999,
p. 132). Lengthy observation periods make it possible to capture long-term growth
consequences of changes in country traits, but require cross-section estimators plagued
by limited degrees of freedom, reverse causation, and simultaneity bias from omitted
variables.
Short periods decrease the bias from omitted variables that change slowly over time,
and permit estimators with country fixed effects (Islam, 1995) to entirely remove the
bias of omitted time-invariant traits. But the shorter the periods, the more the model
likely mis-specifies the timing between growth and its determinants and comes to be
dominated by measurement error (Barro, 1997, p. 42 and 15). Nevertheless, [t]oo
often researchers use fixed effects approaches to analyse the effects of variables ... that
will affect growth only with a long lag (Temple, 1999, p. 132). Hypothesis tests
regarding these growth determinants will suffer from low power. No consensus solution
to this dilemma has emerged. Durlauf and Quah (1999) warn against short periods,
while Islam, N. (2003b, p. 332) agrees with Temple (1999, p. 113) that the use of panels
is often the best way forward.
Our approach is as follows: we use short-period panel data, which allow country fixed
effects to be differenced away; we allow for the possibility that the growth effect of aid
arrives with a time lag; and consider a subset of aid that does not include aid flows
whose growth effect is most likely to arrive decades in the future, or never.
5 Other studies before Clemens et al. (2004) consider aid disaggregated by purpose but none with the aim
of analysing the growth impact within an appropriate time horizon. Owens and Hoddinott (1999) find that
household welfare in Zimbabwe is increased by development aid (such as agricultural extension) more than
by humanitarian aid (such as food aid), even in humanitarian emergencies. Mavrotas (2002) disaggregates aid
into program, project and technical assistance flows, and finds a negative correlation between growth and
all three types of aid in India 1970–92.
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2.2. A Lack of Reliable Instruments
All of the major studies of aid and growth since Boone’s have used instrumental vari-
ables for aid. Certainly, it is important to employ some strategy for identifying the
causal component of the aid–growth relationship, since any observed correlation
between aid and growth could plausibly result from reverse causation or simultaneous
causation by omitted variables. The use of instrumental variables is only one approach
to identification, however, and this literature’s search for strong, valid instrumental
variables has encountered difficulties.
Here, we discuss the instruments used in the most influential published studies in
this literature.6 Three of these, whose regression specifications we recreate below, are
Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000; 2004) (henceforth BD) and Rajan and
Subramanian (2008) (henceforth RS). We also discuss the instruments used in a fourth
published study as influential as these others, Hansen and Tarp (2000; 2001)
(henceforth HT), and those in Clemens et al. (2004) (henceforth CRB), both of which
use regression specifications similar to those in BD. All of these studies use as instru-
ments some measure of political ties to donors (former colonial relationships, arms
sales, and so on). The remaining instruments are primarily either related to lagged aid
flows (HT, CRB) or to the size of the recipient country (Boone, BD, RS).
All of these instruments raise questions about how strong or valid we can take them
to be. Lagged aid flows might well affect current growth, biasing the resulting coeffi-
cient on aid. HT and CRB find positive and statistically significant effects of aid on
growth. But while both HT and CRB test for correlation between the instruments and
the residuals, existing tests of this correlation have notoriously low power to reject the
null of no correlation. Instrumenting for current aid with lagged aid raises the possi-
bility that the coefficient on aid is substantially biased by invalid instruments (IV).
We come now to the core regressions of Boone, BD and RS, all of which instrument
for aid primarily with some combination of political ties to donors and the size of the
recipient country’s population.7 In all three studies, population size is responsible for
most of the instrumentation power.
In the core results of Boone and RS, in fact, essentially all instrument strength
derives from population size alone. There are two ways to see this. First, the single
constructed instrument used in the core regressions of RS is almost perfectly correlated
6 We measure influence by citations of all versions of each study in the Google Scholar internet search
engine as of 22 July 2010, divided by the number of years since (and including) the year of publication. The
four most influential studies are Burnside and Dollar (198 citations/year, 2,176 total), Rajan and Subrama-
nian (125 citations/year, 377 total), Hansen and Tarp (60 citations/year, 597 total) and Boone (49 citations/
year, 741 total).
7 The excluded instruments in the core specification of Boone are ln(population), dummy for friend of
US and dummy for friend of OPEC (where friend equals one if the recipient receives more than 1% of the
total aid budget of each donor), and dummy for friend of France (defined as membership in the Franc
zone). The excluded instruments in BD are ln(population), lagged arms imports/total imports, Egypt
dummy, Franc zone dummy, Central America dummy, ln(initial income)  policy, ln(population)  policy,
(lagged arms imports/total imports)  policy, [ln (initial income)2]  policy, and [ln (population)2] 
policy (where policy is an index of inflation, budget balance, and openness to trade). The excluded
instrument in RS is a single recipient-level variable constructed from donor-recipient measures of the fol-
lowing instruments: dummies for common language, dummies for current and former colonial relationships,
separate dummies for former colonies of four countries (UK, France, Spain and Portugal), the logarithm of
the ratio of donor population to recipient population and the interaction of the preceding variable with a
dummy for current or past colonial relationship.
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with population size. The absolute value of the correlation between the RS instrument
and ln(population) is 0.93 in their 1970–2000 period and 0.95 in the 1980–2000 and
1990–2000 periods (Bazzi and Clemens, 2010). The three-stage RS procedure con-
structs an instrument that contains almost no information beyond the size of the
recipient’s population and does not materially improve on simply instrumenting with
population size.
Second, and more directly, when the instruments containing population are
included in the second-stage regression, instrumentation power drops dramatically in
Boone, BD and RS. In Boone and RS, it collapses completely. Table 1 shows this result.8
The second column shows a core result of Boone’s with aid instrumented by popula-
tion size and several variables capturing political ties. The Cragg and Donald (1993)
and Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F-statistics are well over 4, roughly the critical value for
strong instrumentation as defined by Stock and Yogo (2005).9 The third column shows
the same regression with ln(population) included in the second stage; instrumentation
strength collapses. This means that the remaining instruments do not capture a suf-
ficient degree of variance in aid flows to remedy the bias of simply running the
regression with OLS meaningfully.
The next three columns of Table 1 show that the BD instrumentation strategy also
relies heavily, but not completely, on population for its strength. When all three BD
instruments containing population size are included in the second stage, the Cragg–
Donald statistic falls from about 20 to about 7. The next column includes all policy-
related variables in the second stage, since current growth could easily affect current
budget balance or inflation, which would invalidate policy as an instrument. With these
in the second stage as well, instrumentation becomes weak.
The remainder of Table 1 shows that when ln(population) is included in the second
stage of RS’s core cross-section regressions, using the authors original data, instru-
mentation strength is gone. The Cragg–Donald statistic falls from about 32 to about
0.1. Rajan and Subramanian’s other, more plausibly valid political instrumental vari-
ables therefore do not capture enough variance in aid for their validity to be relevant.
The results in Table 1 collectively mean that Boone and RS are effectively instru-
menting for aid with population size alone, and BD are resting their instrumentation
strength primarily upon population size.10
Relying on country population as an instrument throws into serious doubt the
validity of the entire instrumentation strategy and, therefore, of all regression results.
There are several channels omitted from the second stages of all of these regressions
through which population size has been found to directly affect growth in published
8 The regressions of Table 1 use the original datasets of BD and RS. The original dataset used by Boone no
longer exists (personal communication from the author). We meticulously reconstructed a dataset to mimic
Boone’s, using his sources and variable definitions. Regressions identical to Boone’s published regressions
using this reconstructed dataset give coefficient estimates corresponding very closely to Boone’s. Our
reconstruction of Boone’s data is available upon request and is described in the online Technical Appendix.
9 Stock and Yogo (2005) show that a Cragg-Donald F-statistic over 4 is likely to signify instrumentation of
sufficient strength that bias in the second-stage coefficient from weak instrumentation is less than 30% of the
OLS bias. Kleibergen and Paap (2006) present a related F-statistic that is robust to heteroscedasticity. The
Kleibergen–Paap statistic does not yet have a corresponding set of critical values, but values well below the
Cragg–Donald critical values suggest that further investigation is essential.
10 In the Rajan and Subramanian regressions that allow for a non-linear effect of aid, instrumentation is
weak even when population is not included in the second stage (Bazzi and Clemens, 2010).
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research. Any one such channel would invalidate population as an instrument in these
aid–growth regressions. These channels include the extent of internal and external
trade (Frankel and Romer, 1999), the mix of goods that a country exports (Hausmann
et al., 2007) and the extent of political integration with neighbours (Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2005), among others. In all of the above studies and others, population is a
strong instrument for a variable that has been found to directly affect growth that is not
included in any aid–growth regression. This throws strong doubt on the ability of the
Boone and RS studies to test the hypotheses they seek to test.11
As a robustness check, RS later employ an alternative identification strategy. They use
the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with panel data to instrument for current
aid levels with lagged differences in aid and other regressors, and to instrument for
current differences in aid with lagged levels of aid and other regressors. It is theoretically
possible that such instruments could strongly instrument for current levels or differ-
ences in aid but in the RS dataset they do not. Existing panel and system-GMM estimators
do not provide a clear way to test for weak instruments but when analogous regressions
are run using Two-Stage Least Squares, instrumentation both by lagged levels and lagged
differences of the RS regressors is extremely weak, with Cragg–Donald F-statistics far
below critical values for strong instruments (Bazzi and Clemens, 2010). This is more
serious than the aforementioned possible invalidity of lagged aid as an instrument,
which is also a concern here; weak instrumentation means that the coefficient estimates
in RS can be as plagued with bias as simple OLS estimates (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
Many authors have searched energetically for an instrumental variable for aid that is
strong and does not raise important questions about its validity. This review never-
theless suggests that readers of the most influential published aid–growth studies
should not discard all doubts that such an instrument has been found.
Table 1
Previous Studies Rely on Population Size for Instrument Strength
Boone Burnside and Dollar
Rajan and
Subramanian
Population IVs in second stage – Yes – Yes Yes – Yes
Policy IVs in second stagey – – – – Yes – –
Cragg–Donald F-statistics 15.70 1.77 19.74 7.04 4.65 31.63 0.13
Kleibergen–Paap F-statistics 7.57 1.69 15.76 5.90 2.77 36.12 0.07
Kleibergen–Paap LM statistics
(p-value)
<0.01 0.20 <0.01 0.06 0.12 <0.01 0.77
Observations 132 132 275 275 275 78 78
Years 1971–90 1970–93 1970–2000
Notes. Population IVs in second stage means that the ln(population) instrument is included in the second
stage in the Boone regression and in the Rajan and Subramanian regression. In the Burnside and Dollar
regression, it means that all three instruments containing population are included in the second stage; these
are ln(population), ln(population)  policy and [ln (population)]2  policy. y Policy IVs in second stage
means that all instruments containing policy are included in the second stage: these are ln(initial
income)  policy, [ln (initial income)2]  policy and (lagged arms imports/total imports)  policy. The
regressions replicated and modified are Boone (1996, Table 4, column V, row 3); Burnside and Dollar (2000,
Table 4, column 3 2SLS) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008, Table 4A, column 2).
11 It also casts doubt on the BD results, though not as clearly, since BD’s instruments remain marginally
strong by the standard of Stock and Yogo even when population is no longer an excluded instrument.
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3. Method: An Alternative Approach to Identification
Lacking an instrumental variable that we can confidently consider both strong and
valid, how might causal identification proceed? We apply the following three-step
method to the three most influential regression specifications in the aid–growth
literature. These steps eliminate most of the major channels through which anything
besides causation of growth by aid could generate a positive correlation between
growth and aid.
We first re-run the core regressions in each of the studies to replicate their results.
Holding the regression specification constant, we then lag the aid variable and dif-
ference the results. This step controls for country fixed effects, allows for aid to have an
impact on growth in the subsequent time period and allows us to avoid relying on a
potentially weak or IV to identify the impact of foreign aid on growth. Next, we explore
the effects of restricting the aid variable to only those portions of aid that might be
expected to affect growth within the relevant time horizon. We call this restricted aid
variable early-impact aid. Finally, we extend the time horizon for the regressions to all
years of currently available data, following Easterly et al. (2004).12
3.1. Reconstructing Data Used by Previous Studies
Our method raises a series of technical challenges. First among these is the challenge
of faithfully reconstructing the datasets used in previous studies. For the BD and RS
studies this is easy; the authors have graciously made their original datasets available.
The Boone analysis required more effort because the original Boone dataset no longer
exists. Boone’s sources and variable definitions are sufficiently clear, however, to allow
us to reconstruct his dataset from publicly available sources. Regressions on our
reconstructed dataset give coefficient estimates closely reflecting those in Boone’s
paper, so we feel comfortable asserting that in all three cases we are working with data
that are either identical to or extremely similar to the data used by the original authors.13
3.2. Disaggregating Aid
A second challenge is to restrict the aid variable to early-impact aid, which excludes
those portions of aid that might not be expected to cause growth during the time
period under study. If there is any ambiguity about what is being funded – notably in
the case of budget-support aid – we leave it in early-impact aid, since some or all of it
could be spent on activities that might be expected to affect growth within a few years.
The inclusion of aid that would not have such an effect would bias the coefficient on
aid towards zero.
Early-impact aid includes: budget support or program aid given for any purpose
and project aid given for real sector investments for infrastructure or to directly support
production in transportation (including roads), communications, energy, banking,
agriculture and industry. It excludes any aid flow that clearly and primarily funds an
12 Because BD and HT use essentially the same data and periods, we treat them as a unit. The results below,
then, are divided in three parts, exploring in turn the results of Boone, BD (and HT) and RS.
13 The online Technical Appendix compares our data with the published results from each paper.
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activity whose growth effect might arrive far in the future or not at all, such as all
technical cooperation, most social sector investments, including in education, health,
population control, and water, all humanitarian aid such as emergency assistance
during natural disasters and food aid and donors administrative/overhead costs and
expenditures on promotion of development awareness.14
3.3. Estimating Early-Impact  Aid
A third challenge is that for most donors in most years covered by the studies we
investigate, the OECD reports purpose-disaggregated aid commitments but only aggre-
gate disbursements. Most donors began reporting purpose-disaggregated commitments
to the OECD in the early 1970s, but OECD data on purpose-disaggregated aid dis-
bursements only begin for a subset of donors in 1990, and do not embrace all donors
until 2002.
One approach to this problem is to use information contained in the historical
purpose-disaggregated commitments to estimate purpose-disaggregated disburse-
ments. We illustrate this method by example. To estimate early-impact disbursements
to Ghana in 1983, we begin with early-impact commitments from the United Kingdom
to Ghana in 1983 and divide by total UK commitments to Ghana in 1983. The resulting
ratio is multiplied by total UK disbursements to Ghana in the same year, resulting in a
dollar estimate of early-impact disbursements from UK to Ghana in 1983. The same
procedure is repeated for each of Ghana’s donors to achieve a separate estimate for
each donor, and finally these amounts are summed across donors to yield an estimate
of the total dollar amount of early-impact aid disbursed to Ghana in 1983 by all
donors. This sum is then divided by the size of the Ghanaian economy in that year. This
same procedure yields our base estimate of early-impact aid disbursements for each
recipient-year.15
This method is theoretically attractive because it is reasonable that the share of aid
disbursed for a broad category of purposes generally reflect the share of aid committed
for that broad category of purposes. It is not easy to posit a model of donor behaviour
that would lead donors who commit their aid mostly for roads – consistently over
several years – to then consistently disburse aid mostly for schools, or vice versa. It
is furthermore empirically attractive because in the few years where true purpose-
disaggregated disbursements are available for comparison (2002–6), the estimated
14 The online Technical Appendix describes in detail the definition of early-impact aid.
15 The numerator for early-impact aid is the product of gross ODA (Net ODA þ Repayments) from OECD
DAC Table 2 and the ratio of total early-impact ODA commitments as classified in the Technical Appendix
over total ODA commitments from the OECD CRS. This product is calculated by donor-recipient pair and
then summed across all donors for a given recipient-year. The denominator in BD and RS is GDP in current
USD and in Boone is GNI in current US dollars. When we include early-impact aid in any regression, it is
accompanied by a term for repayments on aid. This is because by definition, any flow of aid disaggregated by
purpose is a gross flow, not a net flow, since repayments on aid are not separated by purpose. Gross repay-
ments on aid must therefore be included as a covariate in any regression that disaggregates aid if the
regression results are to be comparable to other regressions whose regressor is net aid (i.e. net of repay-
ments). When the aid variable is net aid then repayments can affect growth, so a fundamentally different
regression is being run if the aid variable is a gross flow and repayments are excluded. This would not be true
if there were a theoretical reason to believe that repayments on aid cannot affect growth; we see no such
reason.
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fraction of disbursements in each category is strongly correlated with the true fraction.
In this period, the correlation between our estimate of early-impact disbursements as a
fraction of total disbursements and true early-impact disbursements as a fraction of
total disbursements is 0.74.
3.4. True Causation Versus Granger Causation
What remains after these corrections is a measurement that, while it does not meet the
strict scientific definition of causation that would arise from a randomised experiment,
does answer a question of great policy relevance: are aid receipts followed within several
years by any degree of increase in economic growth? That is, does aid exhibit Granger
(1969) causation of growth? Certainly, a donor interested in promoting economic
growth in the recipient would want to know the answer.
It is naturally possible for non-causal mechanisms to produce Granger causality. It is
possible, for example, that aid donors correctly foresee recipients growth patterns
several years into the future. But evidence suggests that growth several years into the
future is highly unpredictable (Easterly et al., 1993) and that donors make large errors
in forecasting recipients growth even in the short term (Batista and Zalduendo, 2004).
This pathway is very doubtful. It is also possible that this pattern could arise as an
artefact of mean reversion in growth combined with causation of aid by growth. That is,
poor growth performance at time t could be both typically accompanied by more aid at
time t and typically followed by better growth performance at time t þ 1, which would
produce a correlation between current aid and later growth, as Roodman (2008)
conjectures. This is easily tested.
4. Results
The results of the most influential aid–growth regressions in the literature would be
different and remarkably uniform if two things had been different about them: first, if
Table 2
Covariates Used in the Most Influential Aid Studies
Boone Burnside and Dollar Rajan and Subramanian
Log GNI relative to OECD Initial GDP/capita Initial GDP/capita
(Log GNI relative to OECD)2 Ethnic fractionalisation Initial policy
GNI/capita growth Assassinations Log initial life expectancy
Population growth Ethnic fractionalisation  assassinations Geography
Terms of trade Sub-Saharan Africa Institutional quality
Debt rescheduling East Asia Log inflation
Sub-Saharan Africa Institutional quality Initial M2/GDP
Asia M2/GDP, lagged Budget balance/GDP
Latin America/Caribbean Policy Revolutions
Period dummies Period dummies Ethnic fractionalisation
Constant Constant Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia
Constant
Note. Definitions of variables can be found in the online Technical Appendix.
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they had allowed aid to affect growth with a time lag and removed aid unlikely to affect
growth within that window and, second, if they had used an identification strategy that
does not rely on poor instrumental variables. Here, we demonstrate this using faithful
reconstructions of the data and regression specifications used in Boone, BD and RS.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for key variables from the three databases.
4.1. The Boone Specification
Table 4 explores the effect of piecewise changes to the regressions of Boone (1996).
Columns (1) and (2) show no relationship between aid and investment in Boone’s OLS
and 2SLS regressions, holding the sample constant (following Boone’s Table 5, col-
umn 2 and Boone’s Table 4, column 4, row 3). However, these regressions use Boone’s
base sample of countries, which deletes from the sample all countries that received
more than 15% of GNI in aid. He does this because it appears that beyond these levels
aid is no longer fungible (Boone, 1996, p. 305). The elimination of these observations
dramatically changed the results.
The fungibility of aid is irrelevant to testing the overall impact of aggregate aid on
growth, and it is precisely less-fungible aid flows that might have the greatest impact.
Dropping these observations is therefore difficult to defend. We tested to see if these
observations should be eliminated as statistical outliers, and they failed that test. These
observations should have been retained throughout the original analysis; thus we retain
them in our remaining regressions. Column (3) shows that with the full sample, even
contemporaneous aid is positively and statistically significantly correlated with invest-
ment in the OLS specification, with a similar but not statistically significant coefficient
in the 2SLS specification on the same sample (column 4).16 As Hansen and Tarp
(2001) note, Boone’s original paper shows that using the full sample makes the
Table 3
Summary Statistics for Aid, Growth and Investment
Dataset Years Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Boone 1971–1991 Investment/GNI 154 0.23 0.07 0.09 0.43
Net ODA/GNI 155 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.50
1971–2001 Investment/GNI 252 0.23 0.08 0.08 0.50
Net ODA/GNI 254 0.07 0.09 0.001 0.52
Burnside and Dollar 1970–1993 Growth 329 1.17 3.76 12.96 18.79
Net ODA/GDP 330 5.45 7.95 0.03 53.82
1970–2005 Growth 503 1.34 3.40 12.96 18.79
Net ODA/GDP 495 5.52 7.88 0.13 53.82
Rajan and Subramanian 1980–2000 Growth 278 0.98 3.44 11.52 19.92
Net ODA/GDP 281 5.51 8.12 0.005 50.56
1970–2005 Growth 491 1.62 3.28 12.30 13.12
Net ODA/GDP 405 5.12 7.45 0.005 50.56
Note. Further detail on the databases are in the online Technical Appendix.
16 Several pairs of regressions in the Tables hold the sample constant, indicated by matching letters in the
Constant Sample row of each Table.
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difference between significance and insignificance for aid – once the full sample is
used, the aid coefficient becomes positive and statistically significant in the 2SLS
regression (Boone’s Table 4, column 5) – but the paper does not discuss this. In other
words, Boone’s research, which is often cited as showing no relationship between aid
and investment, actually shows a positive and significant relationship.
If reverse causation of higher aid by lower investment were an important determin-
ant of the aid coefficient, we would expect lagging aid to raise the coefficient on aid.
Columns (5) and (6) show the effect of lagging aid by one (10-year) period; the
coefficient on aid rises substantially. If simultaneous causation by omitted time-invari-
ant country traits that depress investment and raise aid were an important determinant
of the aid coefficient, we would expect first-differencing to raise the coefficient on aid.
Columns (7) and (8) show the effect of first-differencing, again holding the sample
constant; the coefficient on aid rises somewhat.
Columns (9) and (10) allow the aid–growth relationship to be non-linear by
including a quadratic term, as suggested by Hansen and Tarp (2001). When aid is
lagged and differenced the coefficient on aid remains similar to those in prior columns
but is no longer statistically significant. Finally, column (11) replaces net ODA in
Table 4
Boone Specification, Original Years (1971–90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Base Base Full Full Full Full
Estimator OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS
Aid lagged? – – – – – Yes
First difference? – – – – – –
Early-impact ODA? – – – – – –
Constant sample a a b b c c
Aid/GDP 0.126 0.093 0.287*** 0.235 0.365*** 0.418***
(0.225) (0.355) (0.100) (0.198) (0.119) (0.156)
Observations 116 116 132 132 126 126
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Sample Full Full Full Full Full
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Aid lagged? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First difference? – Yes – Yes –
Early-impact ODA? – – – – Yes
Constant sample d d e f g
Aid/GDP 0.336*** 0.357*** 0.079 0.335 1.226
(0.123) (0.105) (0.452) (0.394) (1.091)
(Aid/GDP)2 1.621 0.100 24.170***
(1.829) (1.631) (8.743)
Observations 56 56 126 56 68
Turning point, in Aid/GNIy 0.024 1.671 0.025*
(0.166) (29.095) (0.015)
Notes. Dependent variable is Investment/GNI, standard errors in parentheses. All regressions use recon-
struction of Boone database for Boone’s original years and include non-aid covariates identical to Boone’s.
Base sample drops countries that received more than 15% of GNI in aid, full sample includes them. All
regressions that use early-impact ODA also include Repayments/GDP and (Repayments/GDP)2, since early-
impact aid is a gross flow and aggregate ODA is a net flow. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. yA Wald test
(delta method) of the hypothesis that A ¼ 0, where A ¼ Aid jdðInvestmentÞ=dðAidÞ ¼ 0, that is, H0:bAid/
2bAid2 ¼ 0.
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column (9) with early-impact aid.17 The resulting coefficients suggest a positive and
statistically significant aid–investment relationship, although with increasing rather
than diminishing returns. The final row tests the hypothesis that the turning point –
the level of aid at which marginal increases in aid are associated with no additional
investment (the extremum of the parabola) – equals zero.
Table 5 repeats the analysis of Table 4 but extends Boone’s data by one additional
10-year period (1991–2000). The broad pattern of coefficients on aid in the previous
Table remains the same, ranging between roughly 0.2 and 0.5, but these become more
precisely estimated in most cases. The coefficients on early-impact aid in columns (11)
and (12) are now at the top of the range of coefficients on aggregate aid, though not
statistically significant. In the last row of the Table, a Wald test in column (10) shows
that the turning point implied jointly by the linear and quadratic aid terms is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. In column (12), the other first differences
Table 5
Boone Specification, Extended Years (1971–2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Base Base Full Full Full Full
Estimator OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS
Aid lagged? – – – – – Yes
First difference? – – – – – –
Early-impact ODA? – – – – – –
Constant sample a a b b c c
Aid/GDP 0.230* 0.209 0.283*** 0.279* 0.308*** 0.310***
(0.131) (0.248) (0.064) (0.161) (0.065) (0.078)
Observations 198 198 214 214 207 207
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Aid lagged? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First difference? – Yes – Yes – Yes
Early-impact ODA? – – – – Yes Yes
Constant sample d d e f g h
Aid/GDP 0.340*** 0.183** 0.435** 0.553*** 0.577 0.615
(0.070) (0.081) (0.201) (0.144) (0.537) (0.516)
(Aid/GDP)2 0.340 1.011*** 0.559 3.659**
(0.419) (0.251) (2.089) (1.822)
Observations 130 130 208 131 147 71
Turning point, in 0.088 0.274*** 0.517 0.084*
Aid/GNIy (0.149) (0.027) (2.401) (0.048)
Notes. Dependent variable is Investment/GNI, standard errors in parentheses. All regressions use recon-
struction of Boone database extending 10 additional years to 2000, and include non-aid covariates identical to
Boone’s. Base sample drops countries that received more than 15% of GNI in aid, full sample includes
them. All regressions that use early-impact ODA also include Repayments/GDP and (Repayments/GDP)2,
since early-impact aid is a gross flow and aggregate ODA is a net flow. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. yA
Wald test (delta method) of the hypothesis that A ¼ 0, where A ¼ Aid jdðInvestmentÞ=dðAidÞ ¼ 0, that is,
H0:bAid/2bAid2 ¼ 0.
17 The same is not possible for column (10) because lagged and differenced early-impact aid with Boone’s
10-year periods would require purpose-disaggregated aid flows from the 1960s, which were not collected by
the OECD. The coefficients on aid and aid squared in column (11) are not jointly statistically significant
(F-test; p-value ¼ 0.44).
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quadratic specification, the turning point is positive and significant at the 10% level.18
Note that these extrema, following Boone, are expressed in aid as a fraction of GNI
(not as a percentage).
These results are not incompatible with Boone’s important finding that large portions
of aid are consumed rather than invested. Such a conclusion is sensible, partly for
fungibility reasons, as Boone argues, but also partly because some aid, such as emer-
gency food aid and disaster relief, is designed to increase consumption rather than
investment and growth. Our findings are, however, incompatible with Boone’s con-
clusion that aid receipts and investment have no relationship whatsoever. Indeed,
Boone’s expressed conclusion is at odds with his own finding of a positive and significant
relationship when using his full sample. Boone’s null conclusion appears to arise from:
the questionable omission of all countries with the largest aid flows, and from a failure to
identify the causal portion of the aid–investment relationship, which Boone either
analyses in simple contemporaneous correlation (in OLS regressions) or with a single
strong but plausibly invalid instrumental variable (in IV regressions) – population size.
4.2. The Burnside and Dollar Specification
Table 6 explores the effects of piecewise changes to the regressions of Burnside and
Dollar (2000). It begins with an OLS analogue of their core regression, using standard
net ODA instead of the non-standard measure of Effective Development Assistance
used by BD – as Burnside and Dollar (2004) themselves do in later work.19
Once again, if reverse causation of aid by poor contemporaneous growth outcomes
were an important bias on the aid coefficient, we would expect lagging aid to sub-
stantially raise the aid coefficient. Column (2) does this, using the same sample as
column (1). The coefficient does substantially rise. Likewise, if omitted country traits
that attract aid and depress growth were important determinants of the aid–growth
correlation, first-differencing should raise the aid coefficient. Column (4) does this,
using the same sample as column (3). The aid coefficient rises markedly, although it
remains statistically insignificant.
18 In interpreting the standard errors on these delta-method estimates of the extremum in a U-shaped
relationship, Lind and Mehlum (2010) suggest using a one-sided test, thus the 10% level of significance. Note
that the exact finite sample estimates based on the Fieller procedure produce qualitatively similar results to
the Delta method in this case.
19 Burnside and Dollar (2000) are unique in the literature in using Effective Development Assistance
(EDA) divided by GDP measured at purchasing power parity (PPP). The numerator is a measure of the net
present value of aid flows taken from Chang et al. (1999), and the denominator from the Penn World Table.
Both of these choices are debatable. With respect to EDA: in a Ricardian world of perfect foresight and
perfect credit markets, the fact that a road is built with a loan that must be repaid decades into the future is
relevant to the capacity of that road to produce growth within a four-year period. But such a model is
irrelevant to how most developing-country consumers using the road make decisions. We prefer, along with
almost all aid–growth studies, to measure aid as ODA. Their denominator of PPP GDP, also rare in the aid–
growth literature, can be justified theoretically under the assumption that most aid is spent on goods and
services with non-tradable local substitutes. Suppose that an aid project in Ethiopia purchases a bulldozer that
does the work of 50 local labourers. This allows those labourers to do something else, and the gain to the
economy is proportional to the value of the bulldozer’s services in local terms – that is, at PPP. If on the other
hand aid is spent on tradable items with no locally available substitute – a vaccine, for example – then the gain
to the recipient economy is simply that of not having to purchase those items for itself on the international
market. This would have to be done by first purchasing dollars, meaning that the value of the aid relative to
the whole economy must be computed using GDP at exchange rates.
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Because all of these regressions include initial GDP per capita, they are vulnerable to
the well-known problem of dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981). Column (5)
instruments for the contemporaneous difference in initial GDP per capita with the
once-lagged difference in initial GDP/capita (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982).20 This
Anderson–Hsiao instrumentation of initial GDP/capita is uniformly strong by the
criteria of Stock and Yogo (2005). Aid remains uninstrumented throughout.
Columns (6)–(8) show that when a quadratic aid term is added to columns (2), (4)
and (5), allowing aid to have a non-linear relationship with growth, the coefficient on
aid rises sharply and is statistically significant at the 10% level or less.21 Finally, columns
Table 6
Burnside and Dollar Specification, Original Years (1970–93)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS A–H
Aid lagged? – Yes – Yes Yes
First difference? – – – Yes Yes
Early-impact ODA? – – – – –
Constant sample a a b b b
Aid/GDP 0.004 0.062 0.024 0.104 0.097
(0.035) (0.069) (0.029) (0.111) (0.102)
Observations 273 273 216 216 216
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Estimator OLS OLS A–H OLS OLS A–H
Aid lagged? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First difference? – Yes Yes – Yes Yes
Early-impact ODA? – – – Yes Yes Yes
Constant sample c b b d e e
Aid/GDP 0.321*** 0.387* 0.407* 0.546* 0.790* 0.742
(0.103) (0.234) (0.226) (0.281) (0.465) (0.575)
(Aid/GDP)2 0.009*** 0.009* 0.009* 0.056*** 0.067** 0.066**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028)
Observations 273 216 216 232 175 175
Turning point, Aid as 17.21*** 21.21*** 21.68*** 4.86*** 5.94*** 5.64*
% of GDPy (2.06) (5.01) (4.97) (1.47) (2.10) (3.06)
Notes. Dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita, standard errors in parentheses. A–H means
Anderson–Hsiao estimator with the contemporaneous difference in initial GDP/capita instrumented by the
once-lagged difference in initial GDP/capita. Aid is not instrumented in any regression. All regressions use
original Burnside and Dollar database and include non-aid covariates identical to Burnside and Dollar’s. All
regressions that use early-impact ODA also include Repayments/GDP and (Repayments/GDP)2, since early-
impact aid is a gross flow and aggregate ODA is a net flow. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. yA Wald test (delta
method) of the hypothesis that A ¼ 0, where A ¼ Aid jdðGrowthÞ=dðAidÞ ¼ 0, that is, H0:bAid/2bAid2 ¼ 0.
20 We avoid the more efficient but much more complex difference-GMM and system-GMM estimators here
because those estimators do not allow us to assess the strength of instrumentation (Bazzi and Clemens, 2010)
while the Anderson–Hsiao estimator does; the system-GMM estimator is now known to generate biased
coefficients in many applied settings (Mehrhoff, 2009; Roodman, 2009); and the Anderson–Hsiao estimator
does substantially eliminate dynamic panel bias in expectation even if it is less efficient for statistical inference
than more complex estimators.
21 Hansen and Tarp (2001) also find that allowing for a non-linear relationship in BD greatly alters the
results.
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(9)–(11) repeat the preceding columns with early-impact aid. The coefficients rise
further and are significant at the 10% level in two of these columns. The turning point
at which the positive aid–growth association becomes zero – now expressed, as in BD, as
a percentage of GDP – is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in columns
(6)–(10) and at the 10% level in column (11).22
Table 7 extends the BD database by 3 four-year periods (1994–7, 1998–2001 and 2002–
5), following Easterly et al. (2004) who extend it by two periods. The results are broadly
similar to those in Table 6: the coefficient on the linear portion of aid is in the range
0.15–0.40 when aid is allowed to have a non-linear relationship with growth. In half of
these regressions the coefficient is significant at the 5% or 10% level. Lagging and dif-
ferencing raises the aid coefficient substantially. The turning point is positive in columns
(6)–(11) but only statistically significant in columns (6)–(8) (using net ODA).
Table 7
Burnside and Dollar Specification, Extended Years (1970–2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS A–H
Aid lagged? – Yes – Yes Yes
First difference? – – – Yes Yes
Early-impact ODA? – – – – –
Constant sample a a b b c
Aid/GDP 0.005 0.045 0.012 0.096 0.004
(0.032) (0.036) (0.034) (0.080) (0.087)
Observations 418 418 361 361 358
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Estimator OLS OLS A–H OLS OLS A–H
Aid lagged? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First difference? – Yes Yes – Yes Yes
Early-impact ODA? – – – Yes Yes Yes
Constant sample d b c e f f
Aid/GDP 0.165** 0.361** 0.314 0.147 0.460* 0.324
(0.078) (0.181) (0.203) (0.167) (0.234) (0.316)
(Aid/GDP)2 0.004** 0.008** 0.009* 0.012 0.030** 0.036*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.020)
Observations 418 361 358 380 323 323
Turning point, Aid 18.59*** 23.21*** 18.01*** 47.84 26.39 4.55
as % of GDPy (2.66) (3.88) (4.72) (510.8) (150.2) (3.15)
Notes. Dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita, standard errors in parentheses. A–H means
Anderson–Hsiao estimator with the contemporaneous difference in initial GDP/capita instrumented by the
once-lagged difference in initial GDP/capita. Aid is not instrumented in any regression. All regressions use
original Burnside and Dollar database extended by three additional four-year periods to 2005, and include
non-aid covariates identical to Burnside and Dollar’s. All regressions that use early-impact ODA also include
Repayments/GDP and (Repayments/GDP)2, since early-impact aid is a gross flow and aggregate ODA is a
net flow. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. yA Wald test (delta method) of the hypothesis that A ¼ 0, where
A ¼ Aid jdðGrowthÞ=dðAidÞ ¼ 0, that is, H0:bAid/2bAid2 ¼ 0.
22 In one of the six regressions, it is only significant at the 10% level, which passes the bar for statistical
significance in the one-sided test recommended by Lind and Mehlum (2010) in this setting.
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In the BD data and design, then, aid receipts are followed on average by increases in
growth for the average recipient when a non-linear relationship is allowed for. This
pattern is not statistically precise in many of the specifications but it is either precise or
close to precise in most of them and the estimated coefficients hover within an
unchanging range close to 0.2–0.3. This result is not sensitive to updating the database
to the most recent available data. As a whole, Tables 6 and 7 suggest that the null result
of BD in column (1) can be attributed to: the imposition of a strictly linear effect of aid
(Hansen and Tarp, 2001); and a failure to identify the causal portion of the aid–growth
relationship, either by testing contemporaneous correlations (OLS) or using poten-
tially IV. It does not arise from the limited range of years they use.
4.3. The Rajan and Subramanian Specification
Table 8 is identical to Table 6 but uses the regression specification, data and periods used
in the panel regressions of Rajan and Subramanian (2008). The results are quite differ-
ent. The coefficient on aid still rises when aid is lagged and rises when the regressions are
run in first difference, as expected if a downward endogeneity bias on the aid coefficient is
Table 8
Rajan and Subramanian Specification, Original Years (1981–2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS A–H
Aid lagged? – Yes – Yes Yes
First difference? – – – Yes Yes
Early-impact ODA? – – – – –
Constant sample a a b b c
Aid/GDP 0.038 0.019 0.128*** 0.019 0.158
(0.048) (0.052) (0.035) (0.093) (0.193)
Observations 236 236 164 164 161
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Estimator OLS OLS A–H OLS OLS A–H
Aid lagged? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First difference? – Yes Yes – Yes Yes
Early-impact ODA? – – – Yes Yes Yes
Constant sample d b c e f f
Aid/GDP 0.071 0.098 0.139 0.011 0.186 1.907
(0.113) (0.159) (0.280) (0.319) (0.428) (2.503)
(Aid/GDP)2 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.167
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.030) (0.035) (0.192)
Observations 236 164 161 226 159 158
Turning point, Aid 16.59 52.69 99.96 1.27 20.38 5.72***
as % of GDPy (15.64) (95.82) (1078.6) (44.69) (197.7) (1.25)
Notes. Dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita, standard errors in parentheses. A–H means
Anderson–Hsiao estimator with the contemporaneous difference in initial GDP/capita instrumented by the
once-lagged difference in initial GDP/capita. Aid is not instrumented in any regression. All regressions use
original Rajan and Subramanian database, and include non-aid covariates identical to Rajan and Subramanian’s.
All regressions thatuse early-impactODA also includeRepayments/GDP and (Repayments/GDP)2, since early-
impact aid is a gross flow and aggregate ODA is a net flow. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. yA Wald test (delta
method) of the hypothesis that A ¼ 0, where A ¼ Aid jdðGrowthÞ=dðAidÞ ¼ 0, that is, H0:bAid/2bAid2 ¼ 0.
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present. But the coefficient on aid is roughly zero in most columns, and is never statist-
ically significant and positive, although the aid turning point is positive and statistically
significant in column (11) – in first differences, using lagged early-impact aid.
Why this difference? The reason becomes clear in Table 9, which extends the RS
database by three additional periods — two backward in time (1970–4 and 1975–9) and
one forward (2001–5).23 Now, the pattern of the coefficients on aid broadly resembles
that in the BD specification of Tables 6 and 7. The aid turning point jointly implied by
Table 9
Rajan and Subramanian Specification, Extended Years (1971–2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS A–H
Aid lagged? – Yes – Yes Yes
First difference? – – – Yes Yes
Early-impact ODA? – – – – –
Constant sample a a b b c
Aid/GDP 0.009 0.023 0.031 0.109 0.058
(0.035) (0.044) (0.034) (0.083) (0.091)
Observations 404 404 323 323 322
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Estimator OLS OLS A–H OLS OLS A–H
Aid lagged? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First difference? – Yes Yes – Yes Yes
Early-impact ODA? – – – Yes Yes Yes
Constant sample d b c e f f
Aid/GDP 0.106 0.247 0.191 0.380** 0.675** 0.513
(0.079) (0.152) (0.166) (0.169) (0.265) (0.384)
(Aid/GDP)2 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.022 0.052** 0.042
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.023) (0.029)
Observations 404 323 322 343 268 268
Turning point, Aid 16.13** 27.77* 22.58* 8.46*** 6.95*** 6.05***
as % of GDPy (6.85) (16.16) (11.63) (3.15) (1.95) (1.79)
Notes. Dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita, standard errors in parentheses. A–H means
Anderson–Hsiao estimator with the contemporaneous difference in initial GDP/capita instrumented by the
once-lagged difference in initial GDP/capita. Aid is not instrumented in any regression. All regressions use
original Rajan and Subramanian database extended by three additional five-year periods – back to 1971 and
forward to 2005 – and include non-aid covariates identical to Rajan and Subramanian’s. All regressions that
use early-impact ODA also include Repayments/GDP and (Repayments/GDP)2, since early-impact aid is a
gross flow and aggregate ODA is a net flow. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. yA Wald test (delta method)
of the hypothesis that A ¼ 0, where A ¼ Aid jdðGrowthÞ=dðAidÞ ¼ 0, that is, H0:bAid/2bAid2 ¼ 0.
23 Extending the sample in this fashion is impossible using precisely RS’s variables, for the sole reason that
the time-variant measure of institutional quality they use begins in 1981. Including this variable thus forces
them to throw away one third of the available data on all other regressors and the dependent variable. Rather
than do this, BD use a time-invariant version of the same measure of institutional quality: the rating for the
early 1980s, held constant. Thus, Table 9 uses the time-invariant institutional variable, allowing analysis of
over 50% more data points than if the time-variant version is used. This is innocuous for two reasons: the large
majority of variance in the institutional quality variable is across countries, not within countries; and RS
conclude that the relationship between aid and growth does not depend on whether or not countries have
good policies and institutions. If this is correct, then even dropping the institutional quality variable from the
regression entirely would not affect the partial aid–growth relationship.
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the linear and quadratic aid terms is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level
in four of the six non-linear specifications and significant at the 10% level in the other
two.24 The key difference is data coverage. The original RS panel regressions omit the
1970s, that is, one third of the data then available.
It makes sense that consideration of a broader range of years would affect the result.
The debt crisis of the 1980s, the crisis of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries in the
1990s and destabilisation following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s were times of
generally poor growth in developing countries and the original RS panel regressions
treat only those years. Conditions were more favourable in the 1970s and the early
2000s, years included in the regressions of Table 9. When these years are included in
the sample, the pattern of coefficients on aid in the RS specifications (Table 9) does
not materially differ from the pattern in the BD specifications (Table 7). These show an
aid coefficient roughly in the range 0.15–0.40.
The results in Table 9 are not necessarily incompatible with RS’s conclusion that the
predicted positive effects of aid inflows on growth are likely to be smaller than sug-
gested by advocates. While some advocates claim a large relationship, the results in this
and other Tables herein show a relationship that is modest rather than large. These
results do not, however, offer grounds for RS’s strong conclusion that aid and growth
have no detectable relationship whatsoever or that the cross-country data may be purely
noise. They suggest that RS’s null result might be attributable to the limited sample of
years in their panel regressions; their restriction in most regressions that the aid effect
be linear25; a failure to identify the causal portion of the aid–growth relationship in
their panel regressions due to weak instruments; and a failure to identify the causal
portion of the aid–growth relationship in their cross-section regressions, due to reli-
ance on a single instrument (population size) that is weak in non-linear specifications
and plausibly invalid in all specifications.26
4.4. Magnitude and Diminishing Returns
The coefficient estimates in the differenced regressions with lagged aid in Tables 4–9
fall in a broad but uniform positive range. The typical coefficients collectively imply
that – at mean aid levels – a one percentage-point increase in Aid/GDP is typically
followed several years later by a modest increase in annual average real GDP per capita
growth of 0.1–0.2 percentage points, and by a modest increase in average Investment/
GDP of 0.3–0.5 percentage points.27
24 Lind and Mehlum (2010) recommend a one-sided test – thus the 10% level of significance – in this
setting.
25 As mentioned above, instrumentation is very weak in all of Rajan and Subramanian’s published
regressions that allow for a non-linear effect (Bazzi and Clemens, 2010). In two of their panel regressions
where aid is instrumented RS do include a squared term but this only aggravates the problem of instrument
weakness.
26 Arndt et al. (2010) corroborate some of these issues with the Rajan and Subramanian specification and
discuss others.
27 For example, the coefficients in Table 7, column (6) and the mean Aid/GDP of 5.5% in Table 3 suggest
that an additional percentage point in aid is associated with a change in growth the following period of
[0.165  6.5 þ (0.004)  6.52][0.165  5.5 þ (0.004)  5. 52] ¼ þ0.117. The same calculation with
other representative coefficients yields þ0.265 (Table 7, column 7), þ0.206 (Table 7, column 8), and þ0.187
(Table 9, column 7). A corresponding calculation for investment (noting that the Boone data are in fractions
rather than percentages) yields þ0.310 (Table 5, column 8) and þ0.522 (Table 5, column 7).
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There is substantial evidence of decreasing returns in this relationship, so that
returns may be much lower at high levels of aid. Typical coefficients in the Tables
suggest an inflection point in the average aid–growth and aid–investment relationships
when aid exceeds roughly 15–25% of GDP.28
5. Robustness
Here, we briefly discuss a series of checks to ensure that the results in Tables 4–9 are not
spuriously generated by mean reversion, by the method of estimating early-impact aid
disbursements,orbyassumptions onthefunctional formof theaid–growthrelationship.29
5.1. Mean Reversion and Reverse Causation
Roodman (2008) conjectures that a positive relationship between lagged aid and
current growth could spuriously arise if countries with poor growth outcomes in the
recent past have better current growth outcomes and vice versa, and poor growth is
followed by greater aid. In such a situation, if the timing of these two phenomena were
suitably arranged, aid would be followed by growth simply because growth later
rebounds from the poor growth that caused the aid, not because aid causes growth.
Such a mechanism is plausible but it cannot generate the results presented here.
Table 10 takes representative regressions from Table 9 and includes twice-lagged
growth as a control variable. If the correlation between current growth and lagged aid
arose primarily because aid flows in the past were being caused by poor growth out-
comes before them, then controlling for twice-lagged growth would substantially
change the results. Including this variable does not substantially change the magnitude
of the coefficient estimates.30
5.2. Early-Impact Aid Estimation
As discussed above, the subset of the regressions presented here that use early-impact
aid cannot directly use early-impact disbursements because the OECD data do not
contain purpose-disaggregated disbursements for most of the years in question. For this
reason, we estimate purpose-disaggregated disbursements using the method outlined
in Section 3.3. Because this method involves using a variable not directly obtained from
the OECD data, it is useful to check the robustness of the results to use of an alternative
measure.
28 For example, the coefficients in Table 7, column (6) suggest an inflection point of (1  0.165)/
(0.004  2) ¼ 20.6. The same calculation with other representative coefficients yields 22.6 (Table 7,
column 7), 17.4 (Table 7, column 8), 24.7 (Table 9, column 7) and 27.3 (Table 5, column 10).
29 In results not reported here, we tested the robustness of the findings to the use of the supply-side
instrumental variables proposed by Tavares (2003). Although those instruments are often weak in the qua-
dratic specifications used here according to the criterion of Stock and Yogo (2005), in regressions where the
instruments are strong the results remain essentially similar.
30 We carried out the same exercise with all regressions in the article and the same is true throughout.
Karras (2006) likewise finds that the aid–growth relationship in time series is not sensitive to controlling for
lagged growth.
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Table 11 shows the effect of replacing estimated disbursements of early-impact aid
with raw data on commitments of early-impact aid from the OECD data. This makes the
variable more transparent, at the cost of greater measurement error, since it does not
make use of historical information on total aid disbursements for each donor–recipient
pair, as our estimated early-impact disbursements variable does. At any rate, this
replacement causes no substantial difference in the representative regressions shown in
Table 11. We performed the same check on all other regressions using early-impact
aid with generally the same result.31
5.3. Influential Observations and Functional Form
Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Easterly et al. (2004) and Roodman (2007) raise the
concern that the results of some aid–growth regressions are driven by a few influential
observations that swing the regression line. Roodman (2008) furthermore speculates
that many aid–growth regressions including a squared term to capture non-linear
effects of aid may generate spurious coefficient estimates due to collinearity between
the squared and linear terms.
Both of these concerns can be directly addressed with semiparametric methods. First,
different intervals of the support of conditional aid can be analysed separately, so that
influential observations in one interval need not affect patterns detected in other
intervals. This is preferable to the controversial practice of selectively deleting
Table 10
Robustness Check: Include Twice-Lagged Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS
Aid lagged? Yes Yes Yes Yes
First difference? – – – –
Early-impact ODA? – – Yes Yes
Aid/GDP 0.106 0.040 0.380** 0.379**
(0.079) (0.074) (0.169) (0.185)
(Aid/GDP)2 0.003 0.003 0.022 0.032**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.015) (0.016)
Twice-lagged growth 0.016 0.001
(0.046) (0.045)
Observations 404 391 343 336
R2 0.371 0.383 0.420 0.427
Notes. Dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita, standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) is
identical to Table 9, column (6), and column (3) is identical to Table 9, column (9). All regressions that use
early-impact ODA also include Repayments/GDP and (Repayments/GDP)2, since early-impact aid is a gross
flow and aggregate ODA is a net flow. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
31 In the process of testing separately for effects of aggregate aid and of purpose-delimited aid, we implicitly
assume that aid is not perfectly fungible. A reasonable conclusion from the aid fungibility literature – surveyed in
Devarajan and Swaroop (2000) and McGillivray and Morrissey (2000) – is that aid is partially fungible. In most
developing countries most of the time, aid does not go mostly to tax breaks, and aid finances capital and current
expenditures in roughly equal amounts. While the intersectoral fungibility of aid appears to vary by sector
(Feyzioğlu et al., 1998) and by country, the literature does not find aid to be fully fungible.
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observations from the data to test for sensitivity to influential observations (Chatterjee
et al., 2000, p. 108). Second, semiparametric analysis makes no assumptions about the
functional form of the partial aid–growth relationship (conditional on the retained
assumption of a linear relationship between growth and the other covariates). If
semiparametric analysis of the partial aid–growth relationship reveals an upward slope
across substantial portions of the data, then neither influential observations nor the
quadratic functional form assumption could be generating the statistically significant
coefficient estimates in the preceding Tables.
Figure 1 displays a scatterplot of the partial aid–growth relationship in one repres-
entative lagged differenced regression from Table 7, column (7). In the original
parametric regression, aid has a statistically significant quadratic relationship with
growth. The plot in Figure 1 partials out the same non-aid covariates from growth
(vertical axis) and aid (horizontal axis). The Figure shows that the positive partial
correlation in the parametric regression result is not produced by one or two influ-
ential observations, and is not generated spuriously by the assumption of a quadratic
partial relationship between aid and growth.
6. Conclusions
These results imply that straightforward changes to the research designs of the most
cited papers in the aid–growth literature move us closer to resolving the divergence
between their findings. There is one broad finding from the regression specifications
used in all of these studies: aid inflows are systematically associated with modest,
positive subsequent growth in cross-country panel data. The principal reasons that
other studies have not observed this relationship are that they tested for aid effects
Table 11
Robustness Check: Replace Estimated Disbursements of Early-Impact Aid With Commitments
of Early-Impact Aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator OLS OLS A–H OLS OLS A–H
Aid lagged? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First difference? – Yes Yes – Yes Yes
Early-impact ODA commitments? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Aid/GDP 0.101 0.304 0.293 0.577*** 0.730*** 0.631**
(0.147) (0.226) (0.279) (0.156) (0.264) (0.315)
(Aid/GDP)2 0.010 0.015 0.018 0.043*** 0.054*** 0.050***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018)
Observations 380 323 323 343 268 268
R2 0.353 0.230 0.030 0.441 0.390 0.367
KP LM statistics (p-value) <0.01 0.02
Notes. Dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita, standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1)–(3)
recapitulate Table 7, columns (9)–(11), replacing estimated early-impact disbursements there with early-
impact commitments here. Columns (4)–(6) recapitulate Table 9, columns (9)–(11), replacing estimated
early-impact disbursements there with early-impact commitments here. All regressions that use early-impact
ODA also include Repayments/GDP and (Repayments/GDP)2, since early-impact aid is a gross flow and
aggregate ODA is a net flow. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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within an inappropriate time horizon, relied too much on weak or invalid instrumental
variables and looked at historical time series that were too short.
Most of the substantial disagreements in the literature’s most influential studies
disappear when aid is allowed to affect growth with a lag, when only portions of aid
relevant to short-term growth are tested for short-term growth effects and when the
historical time series under observation is extended to include all available data. This
finding does not depend on assumptions about the functional form of the aid–growth
relationship, does not arise from a handful of influential observations and is not an
artefact of mean reversion.
Clearly, the fact that increases in aid are typically followed by increases in growth is a
necessary but not sufficient condition to demonstrate scientifically that aid causes
growth. There are related debates about the direction of causality between investment
and growth, savings and growth, health outcomes and growth, and institutions and
growth, to name a few. In other words, Granger causality does not strictly imply true
causality. As we point out, however, the aid–growth literature does not currently possess
a strong and patently valid instrumental variable with which to reliably test the
hypothesis that aid strictly causes growth, raising significant doubts about the conclu-
sions of the studies that have relied on instrumentation. The most plausible explana-
tion for the fact that aid increases are systematically followed by growth increases on
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Fig. 1. Semiparametric View of the Partial Aid–Growth Relationship in Table 7, column (7)
Note. The vertical axis shows the residual when growth is regressed on all covariates except
Aid/GDP and (Aid/GDP)2. The horizontal axis shows the residual when Aid/GDP is re-
gressed on all other covariates except (Aid/GDP)2.
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little empirical support for the notion that aid systematically reduces growth (Temple,
2010).
The results do not by any means imply that aid works everywhere, or even in the
median country. First, even if working is taken to mean contributing to economic
growth, a universal trait of aid–growth analyses (and growth studies more broadly) is
that a very large number of countries lie well above and well below the regression line;
it is clear that in many countries, even large aid inflows have been insufficient to spark
growth over any time horizon. Second, there are many other metrics against which aid
could be judged to work even if there were no growth impact; the aid money that
supported the smallpox eradication campaign accomplished its goal, whether or not
that campaign’s success will ever be felt in the national accounts. Finally, aid appears to
have a non-linear effect on growth, and there may be limits on the degree to which
even large aid receipts can further increase growth in the typical recipient (Gupta and
Heller, 2002).
These results do not suggest that aid can or should be the main driver of growth. As
Kraay (2006) points out, far more of the variance in growth across countries is ac-
counted for by the non-aid covariates in these regressions than by the aid variable.
Many important growth successes across the developing world have been accomplished
with relatively little foreign aid, such as in post-Mao China and in post-renovation
( ) Vietnam. But the findings do suggest that on average – over all countries,
over many decades, and regardless of the regression specification – aid has had a
modest positive effect on growth.
Center for Global Development
United States Agency for International Development
University of Wisconsin, Madison
University of California, San Diego
Submitted: 31 May 2005
Accepted: 10 July 2011
Additional Supporting information may be found in the online version of this article:
Appendix S1. Reconstruction of Datasets.
Appendix S2. Variable Definitions and Sources.
Table S1. Correspondence Between Results from Reconstructed Boone Data and
Published Regressions.
Table S2. Correspondence Between Results from Reconstructed Burnside and Dollar
Data and Published Regressions.
Table S3. Correspondence Between Results from Reconstructed Rajan and Subrama-
nian Data and Published Regressions.
Appendix S3. Definition of Early-Impact Aid.
Table S4. OECD ODA Commitment Totals by Purpose and Category, 2002–5.
Please note: The RES and Wiley-Blackwell are not responsible for the content or
functionality of any supporting materials supplied by the authors. Any queries (other
than missing material) should be directed to the authors of the article.
614 [ J U N ET H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L
 2011 The Author(s). The Economic Journal  2011 Royal Economic Society.
References
Anderson, T. and Hsiao, C. (1982). Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using panel data, Journal
of Econometrics, vol. 18(1), pp. 47–82.
Arndt, C., Jones, S. and Tarp, F. (2010). Aid, growth, and development: have we come full circle?, Journal of
Globalization and Development, vol. 1(2), pp. 1–26.
Barro, R.J. (1997). Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study, Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press.
Batista, C. and Zalduendo, J. (2004). Can the IMF’s medium-term growth projections be improved? IMF
Working Papers, No. 232, International Monetary Fund.
Bazzi, S. and Clemens, M.A. (2010). Blunt instruments: a cautionary note on establishing the causes of
economic growth, Working Papers, No. 171, Center for Global Development.
Boone, P. (1996). Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid, European Economic Review, vol. 40(2),
pp. 289–329.
Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. (2000). Aid, policies, and growth, American Economic Review, vol. 90(4),
pp. 847–68.
Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. (2004). Aid, policies, and growth: revisiting the evidence, Policy Research
Working Paper Series, The World Bank.
Chang, C.C., Fernández-Arias, E. and Servén, L. (1999). Measuring aid flows: a new approach, Policy
Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank.
Chatterjee, S., Hadi, A.S. and Price, B. (2000). Regression Analysis by Example, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Chauvet, L. and Guillaumont, P. (2004). Aid and growth revisited: policy, economic vulnerability and
political instability, in (B. Tungodden, N. Stern and I. Kolstad, eds.), Towards Pro-Poor Policies: Aid,
Institutions, and Globalization, pp. 95–109, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clemens, M.A., Radelet, S. and Bhavnani, R.R. (2004). Counting chickens when they hatch: the short-term
effect of aid on growth, Working Paper No. 6 44, Center for Global Development.
Collier, P. and Dehn, J. (2001). Aid, shocks, and growth, Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World
Bank.
Collier, P. and Dollar, D. (2002). Aid allocation and poverty reduction, European Economic Review, vol. 46(8),
pp. 1475–500.
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004). Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict societies, European Economic Review,
vol. 48(5), pp. 1125–45.
Cragg, J.G. and Donald, S.G. (1993). Testing identifiability and specification in instrumental variable mod-
els, Econometric Theory, vol. 9(02), pp. 222–40.
Dalgaard, C.-J. and Hansen, H. (2001). On aid, growth and good policies, Journal of Development Studies, vol.
37(6), pp. 17–41.
Dalgaard, C.-J., Hansen, H. and Tarp, F. (2004). On the empirics of foreign aid and growth, Economic
Journal, vol. 114(496), pp. F191–216.
Devarajan, S. and Swaroop, V. (2000). The implications of foreign aid fungibility for development assistance,
in (C.L. Gilbert and D. Vines, eds.), The World Bank: Structure and Policies, pp. 196–209, New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Djankov, S., Montalvo, J. and Reynal-Querol, M. (2008). The curse of aid, Journal of Economic Growth, vol.
13(3), vol. 169–94.
Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P. and Thiele, R. (2008). Does aid for education educate children? Evidence from
panel data, World Bank Economic Review, vol. 22(2), pp. 291–314.
Durlauf, S.N. and Quah, D.T. (1999). The new empirics of economic growth, in ( J. Taylor and M. Woodford,
eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1A, pp. 235–308, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Easterly, W. (2003). Can foreign aid buy growth?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17(3), pp. 23–48.
Easterly, W. (2006). The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So
Little Good, New York: The Penguin Press.
Easterly, W., Kremer, M., Pritchett, L. and Summers, L.H. (1993). Good policy or good luck?: country growth
performance and temporary shocks, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 32(3), pp. 459–83.
Easterly, W., Levine, R. and Roodman, D. (2004). Aid, policies, and growth: comment, American Economic
Review, vol. 94(3), pp. 774–80.
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